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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LELAND D. MORAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 240884

v.
GEORGIA R. SHAW, Acting Director,
Utah State Department of Public
Safety, Driver's License Division,
Defendant and Respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals from the District Court's affirmation of a Driver's License Revocation Hearing revoking Appel!ant's driver's license for refusal to submit to a chemical
test pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44.10.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
A non-jury trial de novo was held on April 19, 1977,
in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson Jr., Judge presiding, the
Court having taken the matter under advisement and on or about
April 20, 1977, the lower Court entered a Judgment

against Ap-

pellant denying Appellant's Petition for restoration of his
driver's license, determining that the Appellant unreasonably
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tated, Section 41-6-44.10,

(1953), as amended.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
AFFIRMATION OF TRIAL COURT'S DECISION.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was operating a motor vehicle on public higt
way I-80 approximately 13 miles east of

~vendover,

ember 24, 1976, at approximately 11:00 p.m.

Utah, on Dec-

A Utah Highway

Patrolman, Gary Ogilvie, caught Appellant's car on radar going
82 m.p.h. and weaving and proceeded to pull him over.
The Appellant was thereafter arrested for driving whil
under the influence of alcohol, read the Miranda warning, and
was then transported to the jail in Wendover, Utah.
An officer Nelson arrived at the jail a short time
later to administer the breathalyzer test.

Appellant demanded

that the officers find and appoint him an attorney.

The testi-

mony was that both the officers explained it was not their duty
do so, but that he could use the phone to contact an attorney
himself.

This opportunity \'las held open to him during the ent:

time he was at the jail.

Appellant actually made calls, but h'

only calls were to try and find a particular casino girl, he
didn't find her.
At various times the officers explained the implied cc
law to the Appellant and the consequences of his refusal.

Ap-

pellant staunchly refused to submit to the test whenever apprc
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Appellant's physical condition and demeanor were testified to as being "hair mussed, eyes red, speech slightly slurred,
unsteady on his feet, alcohol on his breath, belligerient, loud,
and argumentative."

The conversations between Appellant and

the officers finally ended in a scuffle wherein Appellant was
pushed into a cell.
the officers.

Thereafter, Appellant refused to respond to

Some time after, the arresting officer had finished

reading the implied consent statute, verbatim, to the Appellant,
while in the cell snoring was heard.

Previously both officers

fully explained the consent statute to Appellant.

Appellant

was released the following day.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION IS SUPPORTED
BY Al1PLE COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE
UPHELD.
This Court in Gassman v. Dorius, 543 P.2d 197, {Utah,
1975), stated that it will not reverse the trial judge unless
he clearly does violence to the facts.

Respondent contends that

the trial court's decision is supported by substantial competent
evidence and should be upheld.
The trial judge, Stewart M. Hansen Jr., found Appellant
was properly instructed with respect to the implied consent law,
that Appellant unreasonably refused to submit to a chemical test.
This conditional demand that an

attorney be appointed for him

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

was unreasonable under the circumstances.
denied his right to contact counsel.
supported by substantial competent

Appellant was not

All of his findings are
evidence and should not be

disturbed under the prior holdings of this court.
Point II
APPELLANT WAS FULLY INFORMED AND UNDERSTOOD
THE IMPLIED CONSENT LAtv AND HIS RIGHTS.
The District Court's findings of fact that Appellant
was properly instructed with respect to the implied consent
is clearly substantiated by the evidence.

s~t

Before Appellant was

taken to the jail, Trooper Ogilvie explained the test and requested him to submit to a breathalyzer test when they arrived
there.

(Tr. p. 8-9).

Officer Ogilvie read the Appellant part

of the implied consent statute before Appellant was put in his
cell and finished reading it verbatim a few minutes afterwards.
(Tr. p. 11, 19, 20).

It should be noted that the implied con-

sent statute does not require a verbatim
just a practice of the department.

reading.

This is

(See Utah Code Annotated

41-6-44.10).
The arresting officers testified that at various times
Appellant's rights under the implied consent statute and the
consequences of his refusal to submit to a test were fully explained to him.

(Tr. p. 9-11, 13, 19, 20, 25).

In Elliot v. Dorius, 557 P.2d 759

(1976), petitioner
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argued that since the officers explained his rights before his
refusal to take the test, rather than immediately after, the
statute was not complied with.

This Court held that "form should

not be alleviated above substance," and that plaintiff had been
sufficiently informed of his rights.
was advised concerning his rights.

In this case, Appellant
Furthermore,

any disjointment

of the explanation was due to Appellant's belligerent behavior and
argumentative attitude, aud he should not be allowed now to benefit from his uncooperative and dangerous behavior.
Point III
APPELLANT UNREASONABLY

RE~USED

TO TAKE THE

BREATHALYZER TEST OFFERED HIM.
The evidence also supports the District Court's findings
of fact that the Appellant did refuse the test and that his refusal was unreasonable since it was strictly conditioned upon
the officer's appointing him an attorney.

This is clearly not

the law.
On the way to jail, officer Ogilvie explained the test to
the Appellant and asked him to submit to it.
refused.

Appellant unqualifiedly

Appellant stated that he had been to an office party

earlier in the day and'knew he would go over." He further retorted
he would fight the officer all the way on it.

(Tr. p. 9).

The foregoing evidence indicates Appellant's belligerance
and undermines Appellant's contention that the only reason for his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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refusal was his desire to consult with his attorney, that was
also argued before the trial judge.

furt~r

Appellant was given

opportunities to submit to the test and replied that he wouldn't
until he had an attorney present and demanded that the officers
get him one.

(Tr. p. 11, 12, 25, 26).

The Appellant's refusals under the circumstances were
found by the trial court to be tantarrount
refusals.

to express, unconditior.

The officers made it perfectly clear to Appellant

that it was not their duty to appoint him an attorney.

The of-

ficers told him "he could make all the calls he wanted."
p. 11).

(Tr.

Appellant had his attorney's card with him, yet he madE

calls, not to his attorney, but to find a casino girl(Tr. p. 11)
When he couldn't contact her, he made no further effort to conta
an attorney, although the phone was always available to him.
He continued to insist that the officers appoint him an attorney
which, as the officers had explained, was not their duty.

After

Appellant was put in a cell, officer Ogilvie told him he would
wait for a while until he made up his mind about calling an attorney.

(Tr. p. 13).

Appellant choose not to respond any

further but ignored the officers.
Appellant refers to Hunter v. Dorius, 23 Utah 2d 122,
451 P.2d 877 (1969), in stating that refusal to take the test
until an attorney was consulted was not a refusal.
facts are quite different than Appellant's.

Hunter's

There, the petitW

had made a bona fide effort to contact her attorney for thir~
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minutes.

Fifteen minutes later, after the officer had written

up an affidavit containing plaintiff's refusal, plaintiff's
attorney finally made contact and advised plaintiff to submit
to the test.

The petitioner in Hunter, told the officer to give

him the test and the officer refused.

There was no undue delay

in Hunter so the court held that plaintiff had not refused under
the statute.

Even in the context of these facts, Justice Ellett

wrote a strong dissent concluding that delay was unreasonable
and unjustified and that there was a refusal to submit to a
chemical test.
In the case at bar, Appellant's only effort to get an
attorney consisted of a call to find a casino girl.

He had

his attorney's card and full use of the telephone but made no
effort to call him or to get a local attorney.

Appellant did

not eventually request the test as in Hunter, but refused to
take, submit, and make possible for the officers to administer the
test.

It appears from this record that Appellant was not

that concerned about having an attorney present and just wanted to
delay.
Appellant also construes the reasoning in Hyde v. Dorius,
549 P.2d 451, Utah (1976), to support his contention that he
neither refused nor submitted to the test, therefore, he has
not refused.

Again, the facts in Hyde are quite contrary to

those presently before the court.

In Hyde, the alleged refusal

came within five minutes after the arrest while the plaintiff
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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never again offered an opportunity to take a test and this cour
rules that four or five minutes was not a reasonable time withi
\Jhich to make a sentient consent or refusal.

There was no con-

structive refusal thereafter since there was no further request
no further refusal.

Again Justice Ellet wrote a powerful disH:

stating that the evidence showing that the officers explained l
consent statute at least on two occassions and that petitioner';
only response that she wanted to go home was sufficient to just:
the District Court's conclusion that there was a refusal.
In the case of bar, Appellant was given many opportuni:
to take the test and refused each time.

The belligerance and

unjustified conditional refusals under the circumstances amountE
to express

refusals.

Appellant was given two hours in which tc

contact an attorney and submit to the test.

(Tr. 21).

The tri,

judge's view of the evidence that the Appellant did actually
refuse to submit to a breathalyzer test and his refusal certain]
was unreasonable under the circumstances, should be upheld.
POINT IV
APPELLANT UNDERSTOOD HIS RIGHTS AND MADE HIS
CONSCIOUS CHOICE TO REFUSE THE CHEMICAL TEST.
As discussed above, trooper Ogilvie explained the imp!:
consent law and the consequences of Appellant's refusal on nume'
ous occasions, so Appellant was aware of his choice and his riq·
thereunder.
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Appellant's attitude as alleged to earlier, ie.,
"I'll fight you all the way," caused the agitation that
existed.

It did not prevent him from making his choice,

but rather indicated his choice not to submit to the test.
This agitation caused by the Appellant should not be allowed
in any way to bear favorably on his case, but rather that
Appellant understood and just wanted to delay or cause
trouble so he wouldn't have to take the test.
Point V
APPELLANT WAS AFFORDED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
After arresting the Appellant, officer Ogilvie
read to him the Miranda warning.

Later at the jail it was

clearly explained to Appellant that he had a right to contact
counsel for himself and that it was not the duty of the officers to find and appoint him an attorney.

It was also

made clear that the "appointment" right referred to an arraignment and not to the chemical test proceeding.

(Tr. 12,

25).

A phone was made available to Appellant for quite
some time (Tr. 12).

Appellant contends he reasonably believed

he could only make one phone call.

The evidence does not

support the contention (Tr. 11-12).
Appellant contends that his demand for an attorney
constituted a reasonable delay.
~'

His authority, Peterson v.

547 P.2d 693, Utah (1976), does not support this
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case on the merits.

In Peterson, the petitioner stated

she would take the test when her attorney _.got there.

The

attorney was contacted and took 45 minutes to arrive at the
jail which the court found to be a reasonable length of
time.

The officer, knowing the attorney was on his way,

left

five or ten minutes before he arrived.

The majority

concluded that there was no refusal because the delay was
reasonable and it appeared that the concern of the petitioner
and the effort of the attorney were bonafide.

Even though

the plaintiff did not expressly refuse, a strong dissent
concluded that a 45 minute delay, even with the attorney
actually on his way, was an unreasonable delay and that the
petitioner did unreasonably refuse to submit to a test.
The Appellant in the case at bar did not even
make an honest effort to contact an attorney, let alone be
waiting for one to arrive.

Therefore, the Peterson case

was found not applicable by the trial court in this case.
Point VI
PUBLIC SAFETY DICTATES AN EFFICIENT AND
EFFECTIVE PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH DRUNK
DRIVERS.
Driving an automobile is a statutory privilege
so the strict rigidities of the criminal system are not
mandatory in a license revocation proceeding.

It is a well-

known fact that drunk drivers are the greatest cause of
highway fatalities.

Because alcohol in the blood dissipates
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there is no place for delay tactics on the part of any
party who mixes alcohol with driving.

The test will also

clear an innocent driver.
In this case, Appellant was driving 82 m.p.h. in
an allegedly intoxicated condition.
CONCLUSION
The whole tenor of Appellant's behavior was one
of delay and beligerance.

Appellant stated he would go over

if the test was given and apparently from the evidence presented was really not that concerned about having an attorney
present.

After he was put in his cell, he refused to re-

spond further.

In light of the public concern for safety

on the highways such antics should not be tolerated by the
law of this state or this Court.

Therefore, the conclusions

of the trial Judge who actually heard the evidence should
be sustained by This Honorable Court.
DATED this _______ day of December, 1977.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
BRUCE M. HALE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondent
this

day of December, 1977, toP. Robert Knight,

1606 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah

84115.
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